

臺灣綜合大學系統 112 學年度學士班轉學生聯合招生考試試題

科目名稱	哲學概論	類組代碼	B20
		科目碼	B2091
※本項考試依簡章規定所有考科均「不可」使用計算機。		本科試題共計 5 頁	
<p>壹、單選題（共二十題，每題 2.5 分）</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 中正哲學系的雙主修制度能讓學生在四年內完成雙主修。請問下列哪一個系中正大學沒有？ (A)生物醫學系；(B)經濟系；(C)社工系；(D)勞工系；(E)心理系。 中正哲學系學生需要完成四個領域的必選課程，以下何者不是必選領域？ (A)心靈哲學；(B)政治哲學；(C)藝術哲學；(D)科學哲學；(E)哲學史。 以下哪一門課是中正哲學系的必修課程？ (A)政治哲學；(B)心靈哲學；(C)語言哲學；(D)以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。 以下哪一個領域是中正哲學系的重點領域？ (A)中國哲學史；(B)西洋哲學史；(C)印度哲學史（含佛學）；(D)以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。 以下哪一位哲學家不是歐陸哲學家？ (A) Paul Ricœur；(B) Willard Van Orman Quine；(C) Henri Bergson；(D) Hans-Georg Gadamer；(E) Jacques Derrida。 以下哪一位哲學家不是分析哲學家？ (A)Ludwig Wittgenstein；(B)Saul Kripke；(C) Alfred Jules Ayer；(D) Hannah Arendt；(E) Rudolf Carnap。 「中文房」(The Chinese Room)屬於哪一個領域的問題？ (A)倫理學；(B)知識論；(C)形上學；(D)心靈哲學；(E)科學哲學。 「個人同一性」(personal identity)屬於哪一個領域的問題？ (A)倫理學；(B)知識論；(C)形上學；(D)心靈哲學；(E)科學哲學。 「證成的無限倒退」(the infinite regress of justification)屬於哪一個領域的問題？ (A)倫理學；(B)知識論；(C)形上學；(D)心靈哲學；(E)科學哲學。 《邏輯哲學論》(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)一書的作者是誰？ (A) Blaise Pascal；(B) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz；(C) Gottlob Frege；(D)Ludwig Wittgenstein；(E) William of Ockham。 《政府論》(Two Treatises of Government)一書的作者是誰？ (A)John Locke；(B)Immanuel Kant；(C) David Hume；(D)Thomas Hobbes；(E) Jean-Jacques Rousseau。 《道德情操論》(The Theory of Moral Sentiments)一書的作者是誰？ (A)Adam Smith；(B)David Hume；(C) Jeremy Bentham；(D) Thomas Reid；(E) Jean-Jacques Rousseau。 《論自由》(On Liberty)一書的作者是誰？ (A)John Stuart Mill；(B)John Locke；(C) Jeremy Bentham；(D) Edmund Burke；(E) John Rawls。 以下哪一個哲學家的主要貢獻不在科學哲學？ (A)Karl Popper；(B)Thomas Kuhn；(C) Nancy Cartwright；(D) Robert Nozick；(E) Paul Feyerabend。 以下哪一個著作的作者是亞里斯多德(Aristotle)？ (A)《理想國》；(B)《尼各馬可倫理學》；(C)《蒂邁歐篇》；(D)《懺悔錄》；(E)《沉思錄》。 《社會契約論》(On the Social Contract)一書的作者是誰？ (A) John Locke；(B) George Berkeley；(C) Jean-Jacques Rousseau；(D) Francis Bacon；(E)David Hume。 			

17. 在「電車問題」(the trolley problem)中，若主張不能殺死一人來救五人，通常被視為反對以下哪一個理論？
 (A)義務論；(B)德行論；(C)效益論；(D)相對主義；(E)利己主義。
18. 笛卡兒認為「我思故我在」，請問笛卡兒是如何得到這個結論？
 (A)上帝的保證；(B)閱讀偉大哲學作品；(C)這個結論是確切無疑的；(D)我感知到我的存在；(E)以上皆是。
19. 笛卡兒的「夢境論證」(the dream argument)是屬於哪一個領域的問題？
 (A)形上學；(B)知識論；(C)心靈哲學；(D)行動哲學；(E)倫理學。
20. 休姆認為透過什麼方式，可以確定兩者之間有因果關係？
 (A)經驗觀察；(B)做實驗；(C)經驗觀察加上理性推論；(D)直覺判斷；(E)沒有方式可以確定。

貳、閱讀測驗。依據選文內容回答問題；請勿以個人知識作答
 (共二十題，每題 2.5 分)

一、知識的條件

Necessary conditions need not also be sufficient conditions. Having four equal sides is a necessary condition for being a square: it is impossible to be a square without having four equal sides. But it is not a sufficient condition: having four equal sides does not guarantee being a square, as some rhomboids (which have four equal sides) are not squares. What about (i) and (ii)? Might they also be, taken together, a sufficient condition for knowledge? And if they are, then knowledge is just the two components of belief and truth added together. That is: S knows p if and only if (i) p is true, and (ii) S believes p.

However, as has been known since Plato's time, belief and truth are not sufficient for knowledge. Suppose someone buys a ticket for the lottery convinced that he will win because his fortune teller told him so, and by a fluke he does. He truly believed that he would win, but he did not know that he would win. As Plato puts it, knowledge is not "correct opinion"; as a contemporary philosopher might say, knowledge cannot be "analyzed" as true belief. What might another component of knowledge be?

The lottery winner has no reasons or evidence for his true belief that he will win. That is, his belief is not justified. Conversely, your true belief that the earth is round is justified—perhaps you read about its shape in a reliable textbook or a knowledgeable teacher told you that it is round. So this suggests that justification is another component of knowledge. Like the belief component, the justification component is also widely accepted. So let us assume that if S knows p, then S must justifiably believe p.

21. 命題(R)「四邊等長」跟命題(S)「這形狀是正方形」的關係是什麼？
 (A)R 是 S 的充分條件；(B)R 是 S 的充分且必要條件；(C) R 是 S 的必要條件；(D) R 不是 S 的充分條件也不是必要條件；(E)不一定，取決於如何定義。
22. 命題(U)「這是真信念」跟命題(V)「這是知識」的關係是什麼？
 (A)U 是 V 的充分條件；(B)U 是 V 的充分且必要條件；(C) U 是 V 的必要條件；(D) U 不是 V 的充分條件也不是必要條件；(E)不一定，取決於如何定義。
23. 在開獎前，樂透得主不知道「我的彩票會中獎」的原因是什麼？
 (A) 他的信念缺乏證成(justification)；(B)他的信念不是真的；(C) 他缺乏信念；(D) 以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。
24. 以下何者可以證成信念？
 (A)理由；(B)證據；(C)可靠的知識來源；(D)以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。
25. 命題(X)「這是證成真信念」跟命題(Y)「這是知識」的關係是什麼？
 (A)X 是 Y 的充分條件；(B)X 是 Y 的充分且必要條件；(C) X 是 Y 的必要條件；(D) X 不是 Y 的充分條件也不是必要條件；(E)不一定，取決於如何定義。

二、物質的構成

As we normally think, physical objects exist in space in a distinctive way: there cannot be two physical objects in the same place at the same time. Ordinary experience seems to confirm this. (You can't park

two cars in a single parking space, after all. Each car excludes the other from the space it occupies.)

But a clever argument seems to show the opposite. Take a lump of clay (call it CLAY) and make a statue (call it STATUE). When you're done, you have a statue occupying a certain region of space. But of course the clay did not disappear when you made your statue. So you also have some clay that occupies the very same region of space. "Big deal," you say. "This is not a case of two objects occupying the same place at the same time. The clay and the statue are the same thing. CLAY = STATUE." But not so fast.

Suppose you made your statue today with clay that had been sitting around for weeks. We can then argue as follows:

- (1) CLAY existed yesterday.
- (2) STATUE did not exist yesterday.
- (3) Therefore, CLAY \neq STATUE.

The premises of this argument are extremely plausible. Is the argument valid? The principle that underlies it can be put as follows:

(*) If X differs from Y in some respect, then $X \neq Y$.

And again, this seems obvious. How can a thing differ from itself? But if (*) is true, the argument is sound and we have refuted the commonsensical idea that two physical objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. (The principle (*) is sometimes called the indiscernibility of identicals.)

26. 下述有哪些理由支持「陶土」(CLAY)與「塑像」(STATUE)是同一個東西？

(A) 兩者的性質皆相同；(B) 兩者相處於同一個時空；(C) 兩者無法區分；(D) 以上皆是；(E) 以上皆非。

27. 下述有哪些理由支持「陶土」(CLAY)與「塑像」(STATUE)是不同一個東西？

(A) 兩者有不同的性質；(B) 塑像作者決定兩者不同；(C) 文中的論證是健全的(sound)；(D) 以上皆是；(E) 以上皆非。

28. 以下哪一個描述滿足(*)原則？

(A) 孫悟空跟齊天大聖是同一個人，且兩者所有性質皆相同；(B) 孫悟空跟豬八戒不是同一個人，且兩者有些性質不同；(C) 陶土跟塑像不是同一個物品，且兩者所有性質皆相同；(D) 前三者皆滿足；(E) 前三者皆未滿足。

29. 以下哪一個描述違反(*)原則？

(A) 爸爸的車跟媽媽的車有些性質不同，且兩者不是同一台車；(B) 聖父跟聖子有些性質不同，且兩者是同一個人；(C) 我的作業跟你的作業不是同一份作業，且兩者所有性質皆相同；(D) 前三者皆違反；(E) 前三者皆未違反。

30. 以下哪一個命題如果為真，可以推翻(*)原則？

(A) 金庸與查良鏞性質皆相同，且兩人是同一個人；(B) 我的寵物跟你的寵物性質皆相同，且兩者不是同一個對象；(C) 心跟腦有些性質不同，且心跟腦是同一個東西；(D) 前三者皆可；(E) 前三者皆不可。

三、種族

This gives us (at least) three positions: races are populations with a common ancient ancestry, social categories of some kind, or nothing at all. The first two are forms of realism about race; the latter is eliminativism about race, so called because races have been "eliminated" from the categories that really apply to things. According to the racial eliminativist, no one is white or Asian, just as no one is an angel or a demon. Quayshawn Spencer uses the genetic results to defend the first, and Anthony Appiah defends the third. The second position is represented by Sally Haslanger.

Suppose that Appiah is right, and that no one belongs to any race. Then what? Should we continue to classify people as white, Asian, and so on, even though no one really is white or Asian? Suppose, alternatively, that Spencer is right, and our racial classifications are often correct, because people belong to the appropriate ancestral/biological category. Given the pernicious influence that biological theories of race have had in the past, is it really a good idea to think of our fellow humans as members

of different biological kinds? (Similar questions could be raised if we suppose that races are like the social categories of serf and aristocrat.) Whatever races turn out to be, there is the further question of how we should continue to talk. And this is where Haslanger joins the debate. She is not primarily concerned to find out what races are, but how we should use terms like “white race” and “Asian race” in a way that will “contribute to empowering critical social agents”.

31. 以下哪一個描述最接近 Anthony Appiah 的種族觀？

(A)種族分類是基於生物學事實；(B)種族分類不是基於生物事實，而是社會建構；(C)種族是由個人定義；(D)種族不存在；(E)種族存在，但應該避免使用這個概念。

32. 以下哪一個描述最接近 Quayshawn Spencer 的種族觀？

(A)種族分類是基於生物學事實；(B)種族分類不是基於生物事實，而是社會建構；(C)種族是由個人定義；(D)種族不存在；(E)種族存在，但應該避免使用這個概念。

33. 以下哪一個描述最接近 Sally Haslanger 的種族觀？

(A)種族分類是基於生物學事實；(B)種族分類不是基於生物事實，而是社會建構；(C)種族是由個人定義；(D)種族不存在；(E)種族存在，但應該避免使用這個概念。

四、福祉

What is it for a human life to go well? Unsurprisingly, there is heated debate about this matter. For example, hedonists claim that a life goes well when it contains as much pleasure and as little pain as possible. Preference-satisfaction theorists concur with hedonists that one should maximize (or bring about as much as possible of) what matters, but they contend that life goes well when one’s preferences are maximally satisfied, whether or not that satisfaction always yields pleasure. Others, call them autonomy theorists, contend that a life goes well if one is respected and supported by others as a free and equal person, one has and exercises the opportunity to develop one’s capacities, and one lives a well-considered life structured by choices made in response to good reasons. Or, perhaps, as some objective list theorists argue, a good life defies a simple formulaic summary, but features an amalgam of specific components, such as being healthy over a reasonably long life; forming good relationships; having satisfying, stimulating work and projects; having access to the resources, abilities, and social freedom that facilitate a comfortable life free from coercion and vulnerability to exploitation; and having a sufficient education and knowledge to make informed, deliberate decisions and to understand and appreciate one’s life, one’s environment, and the other goods life offers.

34. 「做自己喜歡的事，即便痛苦也可以」，最接近哪一個福祉理論？

(A)hedonism；(B) preference-satisfaction theory；(C)autonomy theory；(D)objective list theory；(E)都不是。

35. 「嫁入豪門享受榮華富貴，但被當成小媳婦的女人」，根據哪一個福祉理論，很難獲得幸福？

(A)hedonism；(B) preference-satisfaction theory；(C)autonomy theory；(D)objective list theory；(E)都是。

36. 「一個犯人，被關在監獄裡無法隨心所欲，整日悶悶不樂，但他受到極好的待遇」，根據哪一個福祉理論，他仍可獲得幸福？

(A)hedonism；(B) preference-satisfaction theory；(C)autonomy theory；(D)objective list theory；(E)都可以。

五、正義與平等

Utilitarian thinkers in the nineteenth century offered a reason for being concerned about economic inequality. Utilitarianism is the view that the right action (or policy or institution) is one that produces the greatest sum of happiness. Assume first that each individual gets some additional happiness from each additional dollar that comes his or her way. Assume also that the increase in happiness declines as the person gets richer. So your 101st dollar gives you more added happiness than does your 201st, which adds more than your 1,001st. This is called “declining marginal utility.” If marginal utility declines, then, all else equal, a greater sum of utility would be generated by shifting resources from someone with more (say, Warren Buffett) to someone with fewer (say, a bus driver or nurse). Buffett will lose a little happiness when he loses a dollar; but that loss will be more than compensated by the

greater increase in happiness for the bus driver or nurse.

But all else is not equal. The utilitarian case for equality needs to take incentives into account. Suppose Warren Buffett will not invest as much if his last dollar is taxed at a high rate. Then, to prevent damaging effects on longer-term growth and standards of living, we will need to be careful not to set the tax rate too high.

Some philosophical egalitarians think that the case for mitigating economic inequalities on grounds of justice is not as dependent as the utilitarian supposes on the facts about declining marginal utility and responsiveness to incentives. According to one important line of philosophical-egalitarian argument, certain kinds of inequalities are unjust because they are unfair. They are unfair because they are based on treating equal persons in indefensibly different ways.

That is the core idea in John Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness." Rawls presents an account of what justice requires by developing a theory about fair terms of social cooperation. Part of that theory—its most strikingly egalitarian part—is the difference principle. According to this principle, inequalities in income and wealth are just only if they are needed to maximize the income and wealth of people in the least advantaged social group. Fair inequalities cover training costs for developing socially valuable skills and provide incentives to encourage people to use their resources and talents for the benefit of all. According to the difference principle, then, the reason for accepting inequalities is not to ensure that people receive what they deserve or to reward contributions or efforts, but to improve the circumstances of the least advantaged group (say, people in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution).

37. 以下哪一個行為，utilitarianism 會認為是對的？

(A)無論會導致什麼結果，做了承諾就是得遵守；(B)人的生命是神聖的，不可殺人；(C)如果殺一個無辜的人可以永久杜絕犯罪保障社會福祉，那就可以殺一個無辜的人；(D) 以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。

38. 在考慮如何公平分配財富，utilitarianism 會考慮哪個因素？

(A)如何增加社會整體最大財富；(B)如何促進社會整體最大福祉；(C)如何讓人人都獲取相等的財富；(D)以上皆是；(E)以上皆非。

39. 以下哪一個關於經濟不平等的描述，最吻合 Rawls 的觀點？

(A)任何經濟不平等都是不正義的，社會最終要達到均富；(B)只要是市場自由競爭所產生的經濟不公平，贏者取多輸者取少，都是正義的；(C)如果忍受經濟不平等可以讓資本家創造社會整體更大的財富，就可以是正義的；(D)如果經濟不平等是國家政策造成，而這政策是經過正當民主化程序產生，就是正義的；(E)如果經濟不正義可以讓弱勢者的財富增加最多，就可以是正義的。

40. 下列哪一個對於 utilitarianism 與 Rawls 的描述是正確的？

(A)兩者的目標都是降低經濟不平等，讓弱勢族群獲得更多的財富；(B)utilitarianism 只重視整體財富最大化，而不考慮如何分配；(C)Rawls 不考慮如何增加社會財富，只要求將現有社會財富分配更多給弱勢族群；(D)以上皆正確；(E)以上皆不正確。